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13
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
PATERNALISM
Donald H. Regan

One of the most troublesome problems concerning the
appropriate extent of government interference with individuals' activity
is the problem of paternalism-that is, the problem of when, if ever,
the state may compel an individual to do or to refrain from some
act or activity "for his own good." One would hardly know this was
a troublesome problem just from looking at the literature on political
and legal philosophy. It is hard to think of an influential philosophical
discussion of the matter more recent than John Stuart Mill's. 1 But
paternalism is a problem which keeps coming up in discussions among
philosophers as well as in discussions among people concerned with
practical questions about the propriety of particular pieces of legis
lation, and it is a problem on which I think there is as yet no com
pletely satisfactory view.
Possibly the reason there has been so little writing on the subject
of paternalism is that the simplest and most natural approach to the
problem-the straightforward hedonistic utilitarian approach-leads
so quickly to what is apparently a dead end. My purpose in writing
189
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this paper is to suggest two other possible justifications for pater
nalism, aside from pleasure-maximization, which are not, so· far as
I know, part of the standard lore associated with the problem. It
may be that my suggestions are part of other people's standard lore
and that no one has ever seen fit to write them down. That is .a risk
I shall have to take.

I
Before I present my "new" justifications of paternalism, I
should like to rehearse very briefly the main points of what I take
to be the standard dialectic of paternalism. In the context of a
hedonistic-utilitarian (which we shall hereafter abbreviate as simply
"utilitarian") approach to the problem of the justification of coercion
by the state, there is one necessary and sufficient condition for pater
nalistic coercion-namely, that the coercion will result in more pleasure
or happiness overall for the individual coerced.2 If people will be
happier overall if they abstain from cigarettes, or from heroin, or if
they wear seat belts in cars or helmets when riding motorcycles, then
we should coerce them to do all of those things. That is all there is
to it.
The reason (perhaps I should say "one reason') why this single
minded pleasure-maximizing approach is unsatisfactory is clear enough.
Anyone who suggests that we are always justified in compelling people
to do that which will make them happiest is ignoring another value
which is not the same as happiness, the value of freedom of choice.
It seems that individuals have a right to make bad choices, or choices
which sacrifice their own future happiness to their present whim, if
that's what they want.
Already we see why paternalism is a problem. It is a problem
precisely because in cases where paternalistic coercion would be
justified on pleasure-maximizing grounds, two important values, plea
sure or happiness on the one hand and freedom on the other, seem to
be irreconcilably opposed. This is what I meant when I said that the
simple straightforward approach leads quickly to an apparent deaJJ
end. We have reached a head-on conflict of very high-level values
before we have. fairly begun our investigation.
To be sure, there are a few more standard moves. One such move
is to suggest that paternalism is justified when the individual coerced
lacks relevant information about the consequences of his acts.3
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Presumably this justification for paternalism gets its force from a
feeling that ignorance is a sort of unfreedom. Since the person who
lacks information is unfree even if we do not intervene to constrain
his choice, we are not really decreasing his freedom by intervening,
and the conflict between freedom and happiness never arises. Just
why being uninformed seems to be a· way of being unfree is an inter
esting question. Certainly it smacks more of a lack of "positive"
freedom than of a lack of "negative" freedom, but as an excuse for
paternalism ignorance is in reasonably good repute even with advocates
of negative freedom. The reason is no doubt to be found in an intimate
connection between human freedom and rationality, but to say just
what that connection is is beyond my present powers. 4
Now if our justification of paternalism is simply people's ignor
ance, it might seem that we have a warrant not for coercing people
but only for educating them. If the reason we feel justified in for
bidding drugs is because we don't think users realize the danger to
themselves, should we not concentrate on informing them of the
danger, and then let them do as they please? In fact, there are a
variety of possible claims we might put forth to justify coercion
in particular cases. Sometimes there simply will not be time to educate
the party coerced, as where an individual threatens to act in a way
which will do him irreparable damage before we can convince him
of what the facts are. In other cases, the party to be coerced may
lack the expertise to understand or use the information he should
have. Stretching the concept of information a bit, we might suggest
that even where expertise is not in question, an individual might have
all the facts within his cognitive grasp and still not really appreciate
them. For example, someone might know all the medical facts about
cigarettes and lung cancer and still fail to appreciate just how horrible
it would be to die of cancer. In a similar vein, we might suggest that
most people are simply incapable of taking very small probabilities
properly into account, and this could be regarded as a sort of ignorance
about consequences. With these arguments, and no doubt others like
them, we can defend a good deal of paternalism with some persua
siveness on the ground that we are interfering only where people
lack information.
Another move we might make, similar to the appeal to ignorance,
is to claim that paternalism is justified when the subject of coercion
is acting under an internal psychological compulsion. In this case
also we might claim not to interfere with freedom, since the subject
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of coercion is already unfree, and we might nonetheless open up
very considerable opportunities for benevolent intervention.
For some it may be that the arguments we have already sketched
will suffice to construct a satisfying theory of when paternalism is
appropriate and when it is not. For myself, I am not yet content.
On the one hand,, it is not clear that even after we limit utilitarian
paternalism

to

cases of incomplete information or psychological

compulsion (or only the first of these) we have given freedom of
choice its due. We are so seldom fully informed of the consequences
of our acts, and we are so seldom quite free of unconscious motivation,
that our whole lives .might be subject; to paternalistic supervision if
other restrictions. It is always possible to make the

there were no

rule-utilitarian move of saying that hy and large government will
do worse at arranging people's happiness than they would do them·
selves, but that seems to leave our claim to freedom too dependent
on a contingency. A somewhat more appealing move, which can he
made in either an act· or a rule-utilitarian framework, would be to
claim that some considerable degree of freedom is a necessary condi
tion of being happy. Unfortunately, this claim is not obviously true
-witness the cases of nuns, soldiers, and others who manage to be
happy inside total institutions-and even if it were true it would still
seem to subordinate to happiness something which is in fact an in
dependent value of equal stature.
I have just been suggesting that even a limited utilitarian paternalism

llU!Y he too strong. I would also suggest that in other cases it may be
too weak. I have a lingering feeling that it may be permissible to
prevent cigarette smoking even by a smoker who has no family, who
is clear-headed and as free of neuroses as a person can be, who is well
informed about his chances of getting cancer and the general dimi
nution of his life expectancy, and who just doesn't give a damn.5
My conclusion, after this rapid survey of the standard moves, is
that there is still considerable room for new approaches to the prob
lem of paternalism.

II
The first suggestion I would li)rn to make is that we might re
gard paternalism as justified by a policy of coercing people in order to
maximize human freedom. Whereas utility-maximizing paternalism
coerces people "for their own good" in the sense of "for their own
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happiness,"

freedom-maximizing

paternalism would coerce people

"for their own good" in the sense of "for their own freedom."
The notion of freedom-maximizing paternalism is suggested by
Mill's example of a contract for slavery. Mill says that although we
generally enforce contracts, because they are made in the exercise
of that liberty which we must respect, we should not enforce contracts
for slavery. The reason is that slavery is the negation of liberty, and
it would he absurd to give significance, in the name of protecting
liberty, to an act by which the contracting party purports to destroy
his liberty absolutely. In Mill's words: "[B]y selling himself for a
slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it beyond
that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose
which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. He
is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer
the presumption in its favor, that would he afforded by his voluntarily
remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require that he
should he free not to he free. It is not freedom to he allowed to
alienate his freedom. "1
Now if Mill is right about this-if the principle of freedom does
not require that a man should he free to destroy his freedom com
pletely-it seems that the principle of freedom also does not require
that a man should he free to destroy his freedom partially. In other
words, if our general reason for letting people do as they please is
that we value freedom, and if it is a countervailing reason in the slavery
case that what the agent pleases will destroy his freedom, then it seems
equally a countervailing reason in the cigarette-smoking case or the seat
belt case that what the agent pleases will destroy his freedom to some
extent.7 When I say cigarette smoking or not wearing a seat belt will
destroy his freedom to some extent, I refer to the fact that these forms
of conduct will, at least statistically, shorten his life span and may also
lead to debilitating disease or crippling injury.
It might he objected that there is a difference between the case
of a contract for slavery and the case of smoking cigarettes, in that
the former is essentially an act destroying freedom while the latter
is only incidentally such an act. Now if what is meant by this is
that the act of selling oneself to he a slave has no other consequence
than the destruction of one's freedom, while the act of smoking a cigar
ette, whatever it does to one's freedom, may also he productive of
pleasure, then I think the argument is misguided. Presumably no
one would sell himself into slavery unless he hoped thereby to
accomplish something very important to him. If we were trying to
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make up a plausible hypothetical case, we would posit a situation
where selling himself into slavery was the only way some individual
could secure the money for a very expensive operation which was
necessary to save his child's life, or something similar. If this is the
context in which the making of a contract for slavery is. being con
sidered, it is clear that the act of selling oneself into slavery does
have consequences other than the mere extinction of one's freedom,
and very important consequences at that.
Possibly what would he meant by saying that the act of selling
oneself into slavery is essentially an act destroying freedom, while
the act of cigarette smoking is only incidentally such an act; is not
simply a matter of reckoning up the consequences, as the previous
paragraph suggests. The claim may he rather that selling oneself
into slavery is objectionable because the good consequences (saving
the child) are obtained only through the mediation of the had
consequences (abdicating one's freedom), whereas in the cigarette. smoking case the good and had consequences flow independently
from the act, and the had consequences are not a means to the
good. If this is what is meant, we are dealing with something like
the Doctrine of Double Effect, and a full discussion would take
us far afield. Accordingly, I shall drop the matter, after observing
that I see no convincing argument, at least along the lines so far
considered,

for treating the

slavery case and the cigarette case

differently.
A somewhat different objection might he raised. We were rather
cavalier in the way we introduced the idea that cigarette smoking
has as one of its consequences a diminution (statistically speaking,
at least) of the smoker's freedom. It might he said that disease,
Injury, and death are not ordinarily regarded as causes of "unfree
dom," hut of disabilities or incapacities which are not strictly a
matter of freedom at all. A long answer to this claim, involving a
lengthy exposition of what we mean by "unfreedom," is possible.
I shall content myself with a short answer, which seems adequate
to this case. We are not trying to minimize unfreedom hut to max
imize freedom, and what we mean by "freedom" in this connection
includes abilities, capacities, and in general whatever is a precondition
for any human activity. What we desire is that the largest number
of people should have the widest possible i:ange of effective choice
about what to do with themselves. From this point of view it is
clear that death and injury and disease are all restrictions on freedom. 8
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An entirely different objection might he raised against the whole
notion of freedom-maximizing paternalism, namely, that it is absurd
to speak of coercing someone in order to promote his freedom. In
fact, it is the objection which is, if not absurd, at least ill-considered.
It would he self-contradictory in some sense to speak of coercing
someone in order to increase his freedom at the point where he
was being coerced, or in the act with respect to which he was being
coerced. 9

But we are not speaking of that. We are speaking of

coercing someone in order to increase his freedom at other times
and in respect of other acts. In this there is no contradiction at
all, just :is there is no contradiction in the utilitarian paternalist
program of promoting people's happiness by making them do things
which make them unhappy at the moment where the coercion is
effective.
We have left until last the most telling criticism of the freedom
maximizing approach, which is that it

assumes freedom can he

quantified and summed up, at least intrapersonally, and interper
sonally as well if our freedom-paternalism is to he connected with
a

broader

principle of freedom-maximization. '0

plainly unanswerable,

This criticism is

if in order to answer it we must provide

anything like a full description of how freedom is measured and
compared. But the parallel criticism of hedonistic utilitarianism is
unanswerable

in the same way, which has not prevented many

people from being utilitarians and many more from believing that
utility-maximization is one important moral consideration.
We can say a few things about how freedom is measured. First
of all, it is clear that we do not determine the extent of a person's
freedom just by counting up the actions available to him (or which
will be available, at all relevant times) and saying that the greater
the number of actions, the greater his freedom. For one thing,
there is no obviously satisfactory criterion for individuating actions.
More important, however, is the fact that freedom to do some
things is much more important than freedom to do others, and
any criterion based on mere counting would ignore such differences.
In deciding how great a person's freedom is, we need to consider
not merely how many different things he can do, hut what the
things he can do are. Freedom to do X will presumably count for
more than freedom to do Y whenever X is more pleasurable to the
particular individual than Y, or more highly valued by a rational
individual than Y, or more essential to the individual's sense of
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his personal identity than Y, and so on. The considerations just
listed do not exhaust the possibilities, and each must be taken as
including the qualification "other things being equal," if only be
cause the considerations we have listed might conflict for particular
values of X and Y.
Now it may seem that in the last paragraph we replaced a nearly
hopeless problem (how to count up actions) with an utterly impos
sible one (how to evaluate bundles of freedom in terms of the rela
tive importance, according to various criteria, of the available actions).
I do not think that is the case. We may•·be no closer to a well-defined
procedure for ranking bundles of freedom (in fact, we may be further
away from such a procedure), but the new problem is one that may
be more amenable to acceptable intuitive judgments than the old
one. If the criterion for ranking bundles of freedom is simply the
number of available actions, my intuition says that almost all the
bundles that arise in practice are going to contain the same infinite
number of actions, and therefore be equally valuable. My intuition
also says, however, that the conclusion that almost all bundles of
freedom which arise in practice are equally valuable is ludicrous.
Once the criterion is expanded to include reference to the importance
of the actions, I find that I can make some rough intuitive judgments,
just as I can make rough intuitive judgments about the relative
happiness of various possible lives. What I am suggesting, then, is,
first_, that freedom-maximization may be no more susceptible than
utility-maximization to the criticism of vagueness, and, second, that
if the notion of freedom-maximization, like the notion of utility
maximization, strikes a responsive chord from somewhere among
our moral intuitions, then we should perhaps struggle along with
this vague notion

just as we

do

with

11

others equally vague.

The most disconcerting part of any utilitarian argument is the
part where the author waves his hands and produces out of nowhere
conclusions about the morality of particular kinds of acts or par
ticular practices. Still, having suggested freedom-maximization, and
having suggested that I have some intuitions about when freedom
is maximized, I feel obliged to apply the principle to a few examples
of paternalism. Reluctantly, therefore, I shall now briefly assume
the role of a moral clairvoyant.
Let us consider first the case of the man who wishes to sell
himself into slavery in order to secure money for an operation for
his otherwise doomed child. Although it was Mill's discussion of
this case which suggested freedom-maximizing paternalism to us, it
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is not at all clear that, even if we accept the freedom-maximizing
principle, we should prevent the enforcement of the contract. The
first question is what is the net effect on the father's freedom of
disallowing the contract? This is not an easy question, since saving
his child may be more important to the man we are talking about
than anything else he will ever do. Depending on whether it is his
only child, and on his views about posterity, it may be important
not merely in the sense that he badly wants to do it, but in the
sense that it touches his deepest feelings about his own worth and
identity. We should also remember that as a slave the man may
have a degree of freedom which is not insignificant. He will have
absolutely no legal freedom, but it is the freedom he is actually
accorded by his master which is of primary importance, and that
could be quite considerable. In sum, I think we might construct
a plausible case in

which,

even considering the father's freedom

alone, we would allow the contract. In general, however, I would
expect it to he the case that, considering the father's freedom alone,
the contract should not he allowed. At this point we need to re
member, though, that other considerations besides the father's free
dom are relevant. Our final decision must surely take into account
not merely the father's freedom hut also the child's freedom, or
the child's happiness, or both. When we weigh these things, the
father's decision to sell himself probably ought to stand.
I think our reluctance to allow the father to sell himself into
slavery is based on two feelings which are not directly related to
our freedom-maximizing principle. First, we refuse to accept the
conditions of the problem, in particular that becoming a slave is
really the only way to save the child. We feel that if a father ever
found himself in such a

position-and

more generally if anyone

ever found himself in a position where he was denied something
so important that he might reasonably decide to sell himself as a
slave in order to get what he was denied-there would he something
drastically wrong with the broader social context, and we ought to
focus on changing the social context instead of coolly allowing the
contract for slavery to he enforced. The second reason we are not
disposed to allow the father to sell himself is that we are concerned
with unfreedom, and not just with freedom (here I qualify a hit
what I said earlier in connection with death, injury, and disease
as causes of unfreedom), at least in the following sense: Assume
that the child, if allowed to die, and the father, if allowed to
become

a slave,

would he losing

exactly the

same quantity of

DONALD H. REGAN

198

freedom. We would prefer the child to die than the father to
become

a slave because there is nothing

positively offensive to

our valuation of freedom in someone's being dead, whereas there
is something very offensive in someone's being alive but totally
unfree.
Consider now a related case, the case of suicide. Or rather, let
us consider two cases of suicide. First, the man who is a terminal
cancer patient, who is bed-ridden and in constant pain, hut still
sufficiently clear-headed so that we regard him as capable of rational
choice, and who wants to end his life. Second, the man who is not
suffering from any gross physical, psychological, or financial handicap,
hut who hasn't many friends or a job he likes, and who simply finds
life a burden which he is convinced he would like to lay aside once
and for all. I do not think either of these men should he prevented
from committing suicide, hut it might seem that freedom-maximizing
paternalism would justify preventing the suicide in both cases, even
though we assume that no one other than the described individuals
is affected. After all, once either of them is dead, he has no freedom
of any kind. So long as he is alive, he has some freedom, which we
may maintain by coercion at the expense of a relatively minor
limitation on the things he is allowed to do. The limitation looks
very small if we describe the things the would-be suicide is not
allowed

to do as "shooting pistols

into his head," "swallowing

poison," and so on, by enumeration. The limitation may not look
quite so small if we describe what the subject is not allowed to do
more candidly as "committing suicide," since that is at least an
act that is likely to he regarded by the person who wants to do
it as fairly important. But we might still feel that the freedom to
commit suicide is less than the freedom which is lost in being dead.
One counterargument is available which is peculiar to the case
of the cancer patient. That is the argument that the cancer victim,
once he reaches the agonizing final stages of that illness, will he
incapable of rational activity and will he subhuman. He will he a
positive offense to our value of freedom, like the man who becomes
a slave, in a way in which the man who simply doesn't enjoy his
life is not.
There is another argument, however, which applies equally to
the cancer patient and the man who is merely tired of life and which
sways me to believe we should allow the suicide even though we
recognize the principle of freedom-maximization. When we prevent
someone from committing suicide, we are not merely preventing
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that act. We are coercing the would-he suicide into every other act
that he does. We are coercing him into getting up in the morning,
dressing, eating, watching television-whatever he fills his time with.
None of this is really done by choice. None of this is done freely. 12
We are assuming, of course, that the desire for an end to one's life
persists. If the wish to commit suicide is only a passing fancy, then
we are probably justified in preventing suicide by one in whom the
desire to commit suicide is transitory. But if the desire to commit
suicide does not pass, then preventing someone from committing
suicide poisons everything else he does in a way in which preventing
him from smoking cigarettes or compelling him to wear a motorcycle
helmet if he rides a motorcycle does not. This is the reason why the
freedom-maximization principle does not entail that suicide should
always be prevented.
Finally, let us look at the case of forbidding someone to smoke
cigarettes, or compelling him to wear a seat belt or a motorcycle
helmet. As my comments made in passing in the previous paragraph
suggest, these are cases where I have some feeling that coercion is
justified. I have this feeling even in the face of assumptions which
rule out the possibility of defending coercion by reference to the
coercee's lack of information. And my feeling seems stronger than
whatever feeling I have that it might possibly be all right to coerce
people just to make them happier. I think the feeling may be account
ed for by appeal to the principle that we may coerce people in
order to protect their freedom. The restrictions involved in forbid
ding cigarettes or requiring a motorcyclist to wear a helmet appear
as relatively slight incursions into the realm of individual freedom.
The diminution of the individual's freedom which might result from
a shorter life, cancer, emphysema, or an accident in which serious
head injury was sustained is considerable. As I observed previously,
forbidding cigarettes or requiring a helmet would not poison other
activities, or cause other apparently free activity to be really unfree.
In short, freedom-maximizing paternalism is made to order for the
purpose of justifying coercion in such matters as these.
Of course, when I say that "forbidding cigarettes or requiring
a helmet would not poison other activities," I am making an obser
vation which I believe to he true in most cases and true contingently,
not one which I believe is true universally or necessarily. It might
he

that if some particular individual were denied cigarettes, he

would be so wracked by nervous tension which he could not other
wise assuage that he would he incapable of any meaningful activity.
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Such an individual should be allowed cigarettes, even on a freedom
maximizing ground. Similarly, there might be individuals who, if
they were only allowed to ride motorcycles wearing helmets, would
prefer not to ride at all. Whether these individuals ought to be
allowed to ride without helmets would depend on just how impor
tant riding was to them, but such individuals are already sufficiently
unusual, I think, so that they might turn out to qualify for an
exception as well.
We should also take note of a distinction between a prohibition
against cigarettes or a requirement of motorcycle helmets and pro
hibitions

against dangerous activiti�s such as mountain climbing.

It is plausible to suppose that there are some people for whom it
is

very important to engage in particular high-risk activities, or

even to engage in just any high-risk activity, so long as it is suf
ficiently risky. Such people ought not necessarily to be restrained.
The point about cigarette smoking and riding a motorcycle without
a helmet is that these are activities which it would be difficult or
impossible to build a life style around and which few people if any
engage in because of the risk involved.
Before we leave the freedom-maximizing principle, one comment
about the exact status of the principle is in order. I have written
as if the freedom-maximizing principle Jllight be taken as compll)tely
displacing the utility-maximizing principle. If we accepted freedom
maximizing and ignored utility completely, we might find ourselves
coercing individuals on paternalistic grounds when the result of
coercion was to secure a small gain in freedom at the cost of a large
loss of utility. Now there might he people to whom such a result
would he acceptable, hut I do not count myself among them. Per
haps we should coerce where a large gain in freedom can he secured
at the cost of a small loss of utility, hut freedom is not the only
goal to be pursued any more than utility is. Where the freedom
maximization principle and the utility-maximization principle con
flict, we may still have a difficult problem about how the conflict
should he resolved. But we have not quite the same problem we
started with-that is, we have not quite the same conflict between
utility and freedom which we ran into at the beginning of the first
section of this paper. Suggesting the freedom-maximizing principle,
or, in other words, suggesting that our concern for freedom might
be embodied in a teleological principle rather than a deontological
one, reveals that there is a way of taking freedom into account
while at the same reducing the number of cases in which utility
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and freedom conflict. The traditional way of looking at the pater
nalism problem seems to assume that any interference with free
choice in any particular case is prima facie unjustifiable, with the
result that every decision in favor of coercion must come as the
resolution

of a conflict between principles.

Under the freedom

maximizing approach, any coercion is presumptively unjustifiable,
but may turn out to be completely innocent, if it is shown that
the overall effect on freedom is positive. 13 In such cases-and it
is cases like cigarettes and heroin, seat belts and motorcycle helmets
that I have in mind-there would then he no conflict of principles.
The

principle

which

reflects

our

concern for freedom and the

principle which reflects our concern for utility would point in the
same direction. 14

III
So

far

we

have

looked at one

"new" justification for

paternalism. I should like now to make a second suggestion, which
is considerably more radical, and to my mind considerably more
interesting. That is the suggestion that we can bring much pater
nalistic legislation under the "harm principle," so that it presents
no special problem at all. By the "harm principle" I mean any
formulation of that central tenet of Mill's On Liberty: "That the
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others." 15 Plainly, the reason why paternalism is ordinarily
thought to present a problem is that it appears to be a matter of
exercising power over an individual, not to prevent harm to others,
but to prevent harm to himself. If there were some good reason
for regarding the harm done as done to a person other than the
agent, the problem would disappear. I think there is a good reason
for regarding the harm done by the agent as done to another, at
least in many cases where paternalism

seems justified. To bring

out that reason, it will be useful to consider a specific case.
Let us consider statutes, of which there are a number, which
make it an offense to ride a motorcycle without wearing a helmet.
Such

statutes

are frequently attacked on the ground that they

compel the cyclist to do something for nobody's good hut his
own and that if he wants to run the risk of serious injury, that
1
is his own business. 6 From this point the defender of the helmet
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statute might take the argument off into the question of com
pleteness of information. That line we shall ignore. Another sug
gestion that the defender of the statute frequently makes goes as
follows: "Anyone who rides a motorcycle without a helmet is
risking serious injury. If he is seriously injured, then he is very
likely at some stage to become a public charge. He will he cared
for in a public hospital, or even if he can afford private care, he
will end up unemployed and drii.wing public compensation. Even
this may not happen in every case, hut certainly in statistical terms
the helmetless cyclist is imposing a burden on public assistance
funds. Since public funds must he raised by taxation, the helmetless
cyclist is in fact hurting someone besides himself."
The argument just stated is not very satisfying. For one thing,
when we consider just what the statistical burden which the motor
cyclist imposes on the public treasury comes to, it may well be that
the "harm" done by the motorcyclist to others hy this route is
outweighed hy the utility to him of riding without a helmet. Further,
the tenuousness of the connection between the conduct and the
"harm" gives the argument something of the false ring of rational
ization. In any case, the opponent of the helmet statute, in order
apparently to avoid the force of the argument, has only to steel
himself and say something like the following: "You go too fast.
You say that the cyclist will he a burden on public assistance
funds, hut the cyclist never asked for public assistance. The cyclist
I have in mind values his freedom, and he realizes that the price
of freedom is to suffer the consequences of his choices. If he suffers
a serious injury, leave him to manage as best he can. Leave him to
private charity, or let him die in the street. So long as you are prepared
to do that, his riding without a helmet doesn't hurt anyone hut
himself."
At this stage the defender of the statute might say: "But we
can't leave him in the street. That would be inhuman. It would
cost us more in suffering to leave him in the street than it would
cost to care for him properly. So you see, he has harmed us, either
way." The obvious retort is: "If you value freedom at all, you must
admit that one person's mere emotional distress at another's behavior
is no justification for making that behavior a crime. If the cyclist
insists on dying in a public thoroughfare, let us remove him, as we
would any other offensive exhibitionist. But so long as he removes
himself from the public eye, he is as entitled to die as to read a
dirty book."
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Now the defender of the statute, if he has not turned on his
heel and stalked off, might say something like the following: "It's
not simply a matter of squeamishness that makes me want to help
the injured cyclist. I have a moral obligation to. Being denied assist
ance when one is injured is a punishment too great to visit on any
one's head just for making a foolish choice, even if the choice was
precisely to risk that punishment. The cyclist may have made his
original choice with full knowledge, but he must regret it now. I
have a general duty to help people in need. My duty would be
satisfied here only if the cyclist did not want help at the time he
needed help. The fact that he decided he would do without help
before he needed it is quite irrelevant." From here the defender of
the statute would go on to say that being put in a position where
one must undertake some burden or expense if one is to satisfy
one's moral obligations (as opposed to reacting on the basis of
one's feelings of pity or horror) is harm, so the cyclist has harmed
someone after all.
At this point it seems the defender of the statute is in a strong
position, and may have won the argument. What remains to be
observed is that if he has won the argument, he has done so by
hitting on a suggestion that makes most of the argument as we
have described it superfluous. What the defender of the statute is
really saying is that the cyclist at the time of deciding to ride
without a helmet and the cyclist at the time of his turning up
with a broken head are different people, and the choice of one
doesn't bind the other. But if the cyclist is a different person at
the later time from the person he was at the time of his original
decision, then the cyclist at the time of his original decision has
harmed another person, and the initial attack on the statute, to
the effect that it violated the "harm principle," was mistaken.
Now it must be admitted that we would ordinarily speak of
the cyclist as a single person throughout the events which befell
him. And it must also be admitted that if we start regarding as separate
persons what we would ordinarily regard as separate time-slices or
time-segments of the same person, we will have opened a can of
worms. Still, I think the suggestion that we should regard separate
time-segments as separate persons, at least for some purposes, cannot
be ignored. The argument we have just made about the cyclist hurting
"another" may seem considerably more plausible if we think, say,
about a man who smokes for twenty years, then quits for ten, and then
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turns up with lung cancer, of which his smoking was a causal
antecedent. Here, it seems, nature has been distinctly unfair.
A similar sort of case may be suggested in connection with moral
responsibility and the infliction of punishment. Even supposing we
hold a retributivist view of punishment, I think we would be reluc
tant to punish an embezzler whom we find out ten years after his
crime and nine-and-a-half years after he has squandered all his ill
gotton gains and returned to a life which has since been absolutely
blameless. The reason is that although the criminal was (and perhaps
timelessly "is") deserving of punish�ent, the criminal is no longer
accessible to us. Inhabiting the criminal's body and social role, we
find a new man.
The suggestion that for purposes of apportioning blame and
punishment our ordinary criteria of personal identity may be in
adequate is at least as old as Locke. 17 What I suggest in addition
is that the problem of who should be allowed to suffer the natural
(i.e., physical, psychological, and so on) consequences of a person's
choices is much like the problem of who should be required to suffer
the moral consequences of a person's choices. If different time
segments of one "person" may be distinguishable in the latter con
text, I thiqk they may be in the former as well. 18
The difficult question, of course, is still before us. If we adopt
any such view as the one I have suggested, the crucial question is,
just what makes different time-segments of what we would ordinarily
regard as one person "different" people? Let us start with the case
of punishment. I would say, roughly, that the embezzler is a dif
ferent person when we discover him ten years later if he is no longer
the sort of person who would embezzle, if placed in the same situation
in which he did so originally (or a similar situation). What this means,
of course, is far from clear. Many moralists, concerned about preserving
freedom of the will, would probably want to hold that the question
"Would Jones, if placed in the following situation, embezzle?" fre
quently does not have a well-defined answer. The theory of identity
of-persons-for-purposes-of-retribution which I have suggested seems
to require, however, that the question "Is Jones the sort of person
who, if placed in the following situation, would embezzle?" should
have a well-defined answer. In that case, the second question, about
what sort of person Jones is, cannot be just the same as the first
question, about what Jones would do. Perhaps the second question
is about what Jones would "probably" do, or what he would be
strongly disposed to do, or what he might do without greatly sur-
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prising those who knew him intimately, or something along these
lines.
If we press on, assuming that further reflection would provide
us with a satisfactory sense of "the sort of person who . . ., " the
first thing we notice is the following. Our embezzler may, after ten
years, be the same person for some purposes and at the same time
be a different person for others. Thus, suppose the embezzler com·
mitted, at the same time he committed embezzlement, an unrelated
aggravated assault. It is at least conceivable that after ten years the
embe�zler has grown much more conscious of duties of trust without
becoming any more disposed to control a volatile temper which
produces occasional physical aggression. In such a case, I think we
might hold it inappropriate to punish the embezzler now for his
embezzlement, but still appropriate to punish him for the assault
(for which we assume he has not been previously punished). 19
Returning to our main topic of paternalism, what, if anything,
makes the motorcyclist a different person after his accident? The
answer, I think, is that the motorcyclist is a different person, in
the relevant respect, if he is no longer the sort of person who would
ignore his future well-being for the sake of small increments of
present utility. Of course, it is not certain that having the accident
will produce any such change in the motorcyclist. But it seems
likely to. In many cases, I should think, the cyclist will not merely
wish he had behaved differently in the past, but will have a new
appreciation of the virtue of prudence, and will alter his attitude
toward risk in the future. Suppose the cyclist is not chastened and
suffers no change in his dispositions toward risky behavior as a
result of his experience. Does that mean we should not help him?
Possibly, but only if we think the cyclist will not change in the
relevant respect further in the future. After all, the cyclist who has
been injured without being educated no more has the right to harm,
by refusing help, any of his future selves who will have learned
prudence than the cyclist who has not been injured has the right
to harm, by not wearing a helmet, future selves who would be
educated by an accident. In short, we are entitled to refuse help,
and we should decline to coerce in the first place, only if the cyclist
is incorrigible. 20
It may occur to the reader to wonder why, if I am prepared
to carry my unorthodox suggestion about personal identity as far
as I have, I do not simply go the whole way and say that the cyclist
is a different person at every moment in time. That would allow
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us to avoid the difficult questions we have wrestled with in the
last few paragraphs about when people are the same at different
times and when they are not. The reason for my reluctance to take
this drastic step is that it would seem to undermine our whole
concept of freedom. Freedom is concerned with making choices,
especially, we like to think, with making rational choices. But
rational choice requires deliberation and essentially involves time.
If no one is ever the same person at successive instants, how can
anyone ever make a rational choice, or a choice for himself? We
might, of course, redefine rationality as an attribute, not of persons,
but of series of persons which correspond to what we used to think
of as persons. But no such radical reconstruction is required, at
least in the present context. In connection with the justification of
paternalism, all we need to recognize is that persons may, despite
bodily continuity, become different persons for some purposes as
they change over time. If we concentrate on consequences which
are drastic, or which are considerably removed in time from the
choices from which they flow, or preferably both, then what I have
suggested about the attenuation over time of personal-identity-for
moral-purposes seems to help in understanding our paternalistic
impulses, and may help in justifying them.
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Zit should be noted that throughout this paper I am adopting the view
point of an "ideal legislator," and even that in a very strong sense. I am
considering when coercion would be justified from the point of view of an
omniscient paternalist, who· not only knows everything about the individual
he is coercing and the consequences of various choices by that individual
but who also has at his disposal means of coercion which can discriminate
perfectly between different individuals and different acts. Thus, our pater
nalist need not frame general prohibitions and weigh the good consequences
of such prohibitions as applied to some coercees against the bad consequences
of the same prohibitions as applied to others. Nor need he take into account
such problems, which may in practice be the most important connected with
paternalism, as the effect of certain kinds of paternalistic legislation on the
administration of the legal system generally. In other words, I am not speak
ing in this paper at a very practical level. It seems to me, however, that
before we can decide what sorts of paternalistic prohibitions are justified
in practice, we need to know, or at least to have an idea, what sort would
be justified for my ideal paternalist. Hence my concern with what I recognize
is a very abstract formulation of the problem.
'Similarly, it is widely accepted that certain statuses, such as infancy or
imbecility, justify paternalism. My present concern is not with the question
of what statuses justify paternalism, but with the question of when, if ever,
we are justified in coercing an individual who has a good general claim not
to be coerced, in other words, who is, to the same extent as the rest of us,
a mature and responsible adult.
•I might have taken refuge in a more standard "beyond the scope of
this essay," but if I knew what the connection between freedom and
rationality was, I should be writing a different essay, and a more impor
tant one.
BI have the same lingering feeling about the justifiability of prohibiting
heroin, requiring the wearing of seat belts in cars and helmets on motor
cycles, and so on. Generally when I mention one of these cases, I shall
intend it as a stand-in for all cases of the same type. What counts as the
"same type" the reader is left to infer from the discussion below.
•On Liberty (Everyman ed., 1910), p. 158.
7Qf course, almost any choice will "destroy the agent's freedom to
some extent" in the sense of reducing or eliminating his freedom to do
some particular acts at various times in the future. But it is only a much
smaller class of choices which will "destroy the agent's freedom to some
extent" in the stronger sense of leaving him, on the whole, significantly
less free after the choice than he would have been had he made a different
choice. Obviously, a principle which goes under the name "freedom-maxi
mization" is concerned with preventing choices of the second kind, not
the first.
BThe inclusion of death along with injury and disease raises a question
which proves troublesome for other "maximizing" theories as well. Are we
really out to maximize human freedom to the extent that we might prohibit
abortion or birth control so long as the totality of human freedom would be
increased by increasing the number of people? I have no wish to undertake
a discussion of that problem in this paper. I think we can distinguish between
freedom, or happiness, or whatever, of people who actually exist, at some
point iii time, independently of our decision about coercion (or other moral
decision), and of people who do not. If we can't make some such distinction,
then the appeal of freedom-maximization is considerably lessened, along with
the appeal of traditional utilitarianism.
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9 This sentence makes it clear that I have cast my lot generally with the
"negative" rather than the "positive" sense of freedom. Even so, I have in
cluded the qualification "in some sense" to take care of peculiar cases, like
the case of an individual who is under a psychological compulsion to do one
particular act in some situation, hut whom we can threaten with a sufficiently
high sanction to override the compulsion, and who then finds himself free
to choose among a wide variety of acts.
•0Strictly, we would not need a cardinal measure of freedom if we were
always concerned with only one person at a time. An ordinal scale ranking
"bundles" of freedom for that person would suffice. If considerations of
risk were introduced in the same way they may he introduced into utility
theory, we might find ourselves with a cardinal measure, which was defined
only up to a linear transformation. Even with more than one person, we
might find ways of making decisions which took everyone's freedom into
account without relying on interpersonal comparisons, such as a generalized
Nash arbitration scheme. (See Luce & Raiffa, Games and Decisions, pp. 124134, 349-350.) Such methods of making decisions affecting more than one
person would fit uncomfortably, however, under the rubric of "freedom
maximization." What we say in the text is sufficiently fuzzy so that it prob
ably doesn't matter much whether we regard ourselves as searching for ordinal
or cardinal measures of freedom. The main object is to suggest that freedom
maximization may not he much vaguer in principle than utility-maximization,
and utilitarian moral philosophers have, for the most part, managed to ignore
the fascinating complications of modern decision theory.
1 1 For the reader who would still claim to have absolutely no sense of
when one bundle of freedom is "greater" than another which neither includes
it nor is included in it, I would suggest that he consider whether he does not
have some intuitions about when one interference with freedom is "greater;'
than another which is logically unrelated. Thus, is it not clear that a prohi
bition against traveling in any self-propelled vehicle would, in general, he a
greater interference with personal freedom than a prohibition against wearing
purple ties? I admit that examples like this don't get us very far. But they
may shake the utter skeptic, to whom this footnote is addressed.
•z Instead of claiming that we coerce the would-he suicide into "whatever
he fills his time with," it might be somewhat more accurate to say we coerce
him into the disjunction of all the things he might fill his time with, but

the point is the same. For a person who would really rather he dead, one
way of filling his time is much like another.
13 I
use "prima facie unjustifiable" and "presumptively unjustifiable" in
what I take to he well-accepted senses, or at least senses parallel to well
accepted senses of "prima facie wrong" and "presumptively
wrong." Very
roughly, an act is prima facie wrong if it possesses some feature which is
always wrong-making, and by virtue of which it will be wrong sans phrase
except when it has some other right-making feature. An act is presumptively
wrong if it has some feature which is generally indicative of wrongness.
••In view of this last paragraph, we may have strained unnecessarily to
try to make plausible the conclusion that preventing suicide is not required
by freedom-maximization. Perhaps preventing suicide would maximize free
dom, but only at too great a cost in utility. Even if we defend allowing
suicide in this way, however, the case is stronger, the less freedom is being
sacrificed when the suicide is allowed. Our argument was not wasted, then,
even if we may have overreached ourselves by stating the' conclusion as
strongly as we did.
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1s on Liberty (Everyman ed., 1910), p. 73.
1 & Jt is worth noting that it is almost always possible to find some way
in which an apparently paternalistic piece of legislation could be held to
prevent harm to others, even without resort to the "burden on public funds"
argument discussed further on in the text. Thus, it has been pointed out to
me by my colleague Vince Blasi that the requirement of motorcycle helmets
might decrease the chance of injury to others when a motorcyclist has an
accident, by making it less likely that he will be stunned and lose control
of his vehicle completely. In the case of cigarettes it could be argued, as
another colleague, Doug Kahn, has suggested, that the smoker harms impres
sionable children by setting them a bad example.
17 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, ch. xxvii. This is
not the place to argue about just what Locke's theory of personal identity
is. In fact, I think that in the chapter cited he suggests at least two different
theories, one of which is not unlike the theory I outline in the text below.
Since I do not propose to indulge in exegesis, I will at least direct the doubtful
reader's attention to the Essay, Bk. II, ch. xxvii, s s 16-26.
1a Derek Parfit has argued convincingly that questions of personal identity
are questions of degree, and Parfit, I am sure, would accept the general notion
that the cyclist or the embezzler might be different persons at different times.
See "Personal Identity," Philosophical Review, LXXX (1971 ), 3. Unfortunately,
Parfit's discussion centers around hypothetical cases of fission and fusion of
consciousness, and is aimed at establishing the possibility that what we ordi
narily speak of as one person is a series of more or less closely connected
ancestral and descendant selves. Parfit does not give any attention to the
question of just where one self becomes another. He does point out that if
we accept this view of personal identity, then the principle of prudence, rather
than being at odds with the principle of concern for others, may be deducible
from it-and may in fact have no other support ! This observation of course
exactly parallels our suggestion that paternalism may be justified by appeal to
the "harm principle."
19 One untoward consequence of the theory I am suggesting might be that
it would place a great strain on our adherence to another principle, the pro
hibition against punishing innocents even when good consequences would
result. When the standard case of securing good consequences by punishing
someone who is innocent is that of the sheriff framing somebody for a crime
he didn't commit in order to avoid a riot, we may be able to say firmly "No
that would be an outrage" in part because of our belief that such cases wouldn't
come up often, so the good consequences lost would not be significant. Our
new principle, if taken seriously, might require nonpunishment of many persons
for crimes which earlier inhabitants of the bodies they are attached to unques
tionable did commit. To let too many such persons go unpunished might
completely undermine the use of punishment as a deterrent. Of course, we
aren't certain punishment has much deterrent effect anyway, but so far we
haven't given up. Even aside from deterrence, the new theory might require
us to discard any judicial system of punishment, even as retribution. Under
the present judicial system and the ordinary view of personal identity, we
know that some innocent persons are convicted, but we console ourselves
with the thought that. the number is small and that no one who is innocent
is convicted "intentionally " despite knowledge of his innocence which is
attributable to the judicial system. If we adopt the suggested view of personal
identity, we might have to conclude that any system of judicial punishment
would convict so many innocent persons that it would be insupportable.
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zo A t this point a difficulty arises which is connected with the problem
of "possible persons" (persons whose existence is prevented by abortion or
birth control) which we encountered in section II. We have suggested that
the cyclist may be coerced because of the possibility that he may develop
into a person who is different in a relevant respect, such as attitude toward
risk, or something of the sort. But we have also admitted that the cyclist
may not develop into such a person. Are we not then interfering to protect
merely possible future selves of the cyclist, and if we are prepared to protect
these merely possible persons, why not the unborn? I think of two possible
answers, or suggestions for answers, both of which have some plausibility.
First, the possible persons we are protecting in the case of the cyclist might
exist even without our intervention, •·even though they also might not (and
might not ever exist even if we do intervene). Possible persons who are about
to be prevented from existing by abortion or birth control quite certainly
will not exist without our intervention. (Spelling this out might involve us
in difficulties about the individuation of possible persons.) Second, it seems
that we may be justified in treating differently possible persons who are
not related by bodily or psychological continuity to any actual persons, and
possible persons who are so related. (This requires a bit of spelling out too,
to explain how a merely possible person could be related by bodily or
psychological continuity to any actual person. I would suggest, however,

that the reader who can't see approximately how this would go just isn't
trying.)

